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“Germany, with its ageing population, should have, 
and can legitimately aim to have, a degree of sur-
plus, but not to the extent we see at the moment: 
four percent would perhaps be justified, but eight 
percent is not.” 
Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the  
International Monetary Fund  
in a press release by the IMF on 12 April 2017
“In recent years, when France produced 100 units  
of goods and services, it consumed and invested 101 
and 102 units on its territory. On the contrary, when 
Germany produces 100 units it only consumes and 
invests 92 units. The gap may seem narrow but  
when it occurs every year it leads to financial  
and social imbalances of considerable size, which  
today threaten to undermine Europe.”
Thomas Piketty, French Economist
in Le Monde on 9 January 2017
“[Germany] has practiced its own austerity […] and 
harassed the ECB as it attempts to boost overall EZ 
inflation. The result is that the competitive gap that 
opened up after 1999 has barely closed, producing 
both huge German surpluses and a deadly drag on 
the rest of the euro area.”
Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize Winner in Economics
in the New York Times on 27 May 2017
Are unequal trade 
balances a problem?
Current account
The current-account bal-
ance consists of three com-
ponents: the balance of 
trade in products and ser-
vices, asset income, for ex-
ample from capital gains, 
and transfers such as mon-
etary transfers overseas.  
In other words, the current-
account balance shows the 
difference between exports 
and imports as well as the 
difference between savings 
and investments.
Savings rate
The national savings rate  
is determined by gross na-
tional income less expendi-
tures. Empirical studies 
show that a lower  savings 
rate is connected with a 
higher  current-account 
deficit. In order to reduce 
the de ficit, the savings rate 
must rise. Reducing a sur-
plus means a country must  
save less.
Internal devaluation
A country can sell its prod-
ucts more cheaply by de-
valuing its currency and 
thereby increasing its com-
petitiveness. In the case of 
an external devaluation, this 
happens when the country’s 
currency loses value. With 
an internal devaluation,  
domestic costs decline. This 
occurs, for example, when 
labour costs rise more slowly 
than productivity.
Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure
Many economic indicators 
are monitored in this proce-
dure. Current-account bal-
ances in the EU may not be 
less than minus four percent 
of GDP or more than plus 
six percent of GDP on aver-
age over three years under 
the agreed procedure.
How are imbalances 
corrected in the EU?
Some Eurozone countries are 
suffering under such imbalances. 
In many euro-area countries, the 
unemployment rate is very high at 
ten percent or more, for example 
in France, Italy and Spain. These 
countries urgently need more 
external demand so as to stimulate 
their economy. In Germany, by con- 
trast, the unemployment rate is at 
four percent, its lowest level since 
reunification.
The euro influences the balance  
of trade through two channels. On  
the one hand, a fairly weak euro makes 
exports cheaper and imports more 
expensive relative to the rest of the 
world, thereby contributing to the 
development of surpluses. A strong 
euro has the reverse effect. On the 
other hand, it is impossible in the 
Eurozone to correct imbalances be-
tween member states by revaluing 
or devaluing the national currency. 
Many years of stagnant wages in Ger-
many therefore led to an  internal 
devaluation, giving the country a 
com petitive advantage that showed 
up in its trade surpluses.
A stronger euro would not automati- 
cally correct the imbalances in the 
EU. If the European Central Bank 
tapered its bond buying programme, 
the euro might appreciate as a result 
and strengthen imports relative to 
exports. However, this would simply 
alter the Eurozone’s trade deficit with 
the rest of the world overall, but not 
the imbalances among the euro-area 
countries. One also needs to take into 
account that Germany, for example, 
had a surplus for many years prior to 
the introduction of the euro. 
The EU can only take limited action 
to address imbalances right now. 
Since 2011, there has been the so-
called  Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure: If deficits or surpluses  
are found to be too high, the Euro- 
pean Commission issues reform re- 
commendations, for example, with 
respect to the labour market or 
investments. However, only a small 
portion of these recommendations 
has been implemented so far.
In the EU, there are imbalances, 
above all in the  current account.  
At first, deficits were criticised, but 
now the issue is sur pluses: During 
the crisis in 2008, half of all member 
states had current -account deficits 
of up to 20 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Other countries have 
been running high surpluses of more 
than eight percent of GDP for years, 
including Denmark, Germany and 
the Netherlands. Germany gener ated a 
surplus of 260 billion euro in 2016, for 
example, which was roughly twice as 
high as that of China, al though the 
Chinese economy is three times bigger. 
Countries with large surpluses are 
criticised from two directions and 
called upon to change practice:  
at both global and European levels. 
Germany, for example, is accused 
globally of exporting too much and 
importing too little. The Trump 
administration in the United States 
particularly finds fault with this. 
Other actors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and leading econo- 
mists complain that Germany saves 
too much and invests too little. 
Within the EU, a second topic of 
 debate concerns surpluses: Here it is  
argued that the German export boom 
contributes to unemployment in other 
Eurozone countries. Instead of stim-
ulating domestic demand, increas-
ing investments and importing more, 
Germany exploits external demand. 
Critics call on the federal government 
to take economic countermeasures.
But there are also opponents of such 
economic policy management. They 
argue that surpluses such as those 
in Germany are due to structural 
factors. The state cannot and should 
not correct such factors, they say. 
One of the main reasons for this, they 
argue, is the demographic structure:  
If you save money for retirement, 
then you consume less and increase 
the  savings rate. Furthermore, wa-
ges have been rising since the crisis 
so surpluses will be corrected by 
market forces, if at all necessary.
“If wages had risen as much as called for, there 
would have been fewer jobs in Germany. [...] How 
can households abroad borrow money in order 
to buy German products? If financial markets 
were regulated such that it were more difficult to 
increase debt levels, the surplus would be lower.” 
Clemens Fuest, President of the ifo Institute 
in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 19 April 2017 
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A look 
ahead
 SCENARIO 1 
Competition between countries
In this scenario, one agrees to view trade imbalances as a natural 
result of structural differences between countries that should be 
corrected through the market:
First, labour costs rise in surplus countries only when collective bar- 
gaining agreements ensure higher wages. The partners in collective- 
bargaining agreements are free from government influence in many 
countries and ensure that the export sectors remain competitive. Second, 
the savings rate is also determined by the demographic structure. The 
population saves for retirement and therefore the savings rate increases. 
If overseas yields are higher, these savings are invested there. Third,  
a drop in global commodity prices affects current-account balances –  
a factor that individual countries cannot influence.
In this scenario, there is only limited political need for action. A 
liberalisation of the service sector in the EU could help, for example, 
with market mechanisms to reduce surpluses. However, in general the 
following applies: If you are dissatisfied with your current-account 
balance, it is up to you to sort this out. The problem in this scenario 
is that it is considered to be unfair both inside and outside Germany. 
Here critics complain that deficit countries suffer from weak demand 
while wages in Germany are too low and have a negative impact on 
the standard of living.
 SCENARIO 2 
Internal revaluation
A contrary scenario would be that Germany reduces its trade imbalances 
and aims for a lower current-account surplus by reversing the internal 
devaluation. Since the state may not intervene in collective wage-bar- 
gaining agreements, it must find other options: 
Possible measures include changes to the tax code such as a reduction 
in value-added tax, which would stimulate consumption. The minimum 
wage could be raised in order to increase the income of low-wage 
earners. The number of hours worked per week could be reduced and 
the retirement age lowered. An increase in state pensions would be an 
incentive for individuals to save less for their retirement and thereby 
reduce the savings rate.
All these measures might lead to an internal revaluation after years 
of internal devaluation. Supporters of such a strategy argue that they 
will achieve more social justice in Germany and also simultaneously 
reduce imbalances within the Eurozone. Opponents fear higher unem- 
ployment and a loss of international competitiveness.
 SCENARIO 3 
More coordination in the EU
Deficit as well as surplus countries would make adjustments  
under the third scenario:
Deficit countries in the EU would have to continue to enhance their 
competitiveness by investing in education and digitisation, for 
example, in order to increase productivity. Furthermore, they would 
have to take measures to fight unemployment. These include reforms 
that increase employment such as life-long learning and active 
labour market policies for job seekers and an expansion of day care 
for parents. Here one would have to clarify whether the countries are 
allowed to finance these measures with new debt in the initial phase 
without breaching the EU’s Stability and Growth Pact.
Surplus countries would have to take measures to increase domestic 
demand, for example by reducing taxes on lower and middle incomes. 
More private and public investment in physical and digital infra-
s tructure would also be an option. As in deficit countries, labour 
market reforms creating more jobs could also help surplus coun tries: 
Since unemployment is already very low, such reforms could raise 
wages across the board.
In this scenario, a reduction of imbalances in deficit countries would  
not be achieved through pay cuts, but rather through higher prod-
uctivity and employment. Surplus countries would not lose their 
competitiveness, but rather consume and invest more in their home 
market. For that to work, EU countries would have to improve their 
coordination and implement clearly defined reforms. 
“Better coordination between surplus and deficit countries in the EU would be 
more than a political compromise: It would mean that countries do not pursue 
wage reductions and jointly focus on future-oriented investments and more 
productivity growth instead.” 
Dr. Anna auf dem Brinke
The author is a Research Fellow at the Jacques Delors Institut – Berlin.
IMBALANCES
Germany saves a lot,  
but invests little# 1
FACT Since 2008 the euro has become cheaper for the  
most important trading partners of the Eurozone 
Index 1999 Q1=100
Current-account balances in the EU:  
More surpluses than deficits 
Current-account balances as a percentage of GDP # 2
FACT
# 3
FACT
1999 2007 201320032000 2008 201420042001 2009 20152005 20112002 2010 20162006 2012
When the euro was launched in 1999, Germany and the EU had an overall current-account 
deficit. During the financial crisis, this deficit increased in most countries, but not in Germany and 
the Netherlands. The deficit countries have recovered since the crisis. The surplus countries  
are continuing to generate large surpluses.
Sources: OECD 2017, World Bank 2017 for the Netherlands (1999–2003).
The chart shows the nominal effective exchange rate of the euro relative to the 19 most impor-
tant trading partners outside of the Eurozone (according to weight): China, United States, United 
Kingdom, Japan, Switzerland, Poland, Czech Republic, Sweden, South Korea, Hungary, Denmark, 
Romania, Canada, Hong Kong, Singapore, Norway, Australia, Croatia and Bulgaria.
Source: ECB 2017.
in % in %
in %
Index
Until 2004, the German savings rate was similar to the Eurozone’s. Since then, it has been 
significantly higher. From 1997 to 2011 the investment rate in Germany was on average three 
percentage points per year below the rate in the Eurozone (not including Germany). As a result,  
less has been invested than in comparable industrialised nations for more than a decade. 
Sources: World Bank 2017, Eurostat 2017, author’s calculations; average for Eurozone 19 not including Germany  
(not weighted); dataset for gross savings rate varies slightly prior to 2005 due to missing data points.
12
10
8
6
4
2
0
-2
-4
-6
-8
-10
Netherlands
France
Spain
Italy 
Germany
EU28
30
25
20
15
10
30
25
20
15
10
1995
1995
2007
2007
1998
1998
2010
2010
2001
2001
2013
2013
2004
2004
2016
2016
Gross savings rate as a percentage of GDP
Investment rate as a percentage of GDP
2003 20112005 20131999 2007 20152001 2009 2017
120
110
100
90
80
Euro-exchange rate
The euro depreciated by 
20 percent France
Eurozone without 
Germany
France
Eurozone without 
Germany
Germany
Germany
The German  
investment rate  
is below the  
Eurozone’s
The German 
savings rate is 
higher than the 
Eurozone’s
www.strengthentheeuro.eu
“Germany, with its ageing population, should have, 
and can legitimately aim to have, a degree of sur-
plus, but not to the extent we see at the moment: 
four percent would perhaps be justified, but eight 
percent is not.” 
Christine Lagarde, Managing Director of the  
International Monetary Fund  
in a press release by the IMF on 12 April 2017
“In recent years, when France produced 100 units  
of goods and services, it consumed and invested 101 
and 102 units on its territory. On the contrary, when 
Germany produces 100 units it only consumes and 
invests 92 units. The gap may seem narrow but  
when it occurs every year it leads to financial  
and social imbalances of considerable size, which  
today threaten to undermine Europe.”
Thomas Piketty, French Economist
in Le Monde on 9 January 2017
“[Germany] has practiced its own austerity […] and 
harassed the ECB as it attempts to boost overall EZ 
inflation. The result is that the competitive gap that 
opened up after 1999 has barely closed, producing 
both huge German surpluses and a deadly drag on 
the rest of the euro area.”
Paul Krugman, Nobel Prize Winner in Economics
in the New York Times on 27 May 2017
Are unequal trade 
balances a problem?
Current account
The current-account bal-
ance consists of three com-
ponents: the balance of 
trade in products and ser-
vices, asset income, for ex-
ample from capital gains, 
and transfers such as mon-
etary transfers overseas.  
In other words, the current-
account balance shows the 
difference between exports 
and imports as well as the 
difference between savings 
and investments.
Savings rate
The national savings rate  
is determined by gross na-
tional income less expendi-
tures. Empirical studies 
show that a lower  savings 
rate is connected with a 
higher  current-account 
deficit. In order to reduce 
the de ficit, the savings rate 
must rise. Reducing a sur-
plus means a country must  
save less.
Internal devaluation
A country can sell its prod-
ucts more cheaply by de-
valuing its currency and 
thereby increasing its com-
petitiveness. In the case of 
an external devaluation, this 
happens when the country’s 
currency loses value. With 
an internal devaluation,  
domestic costs decline. This 
occurs, for example, when 
labour costs rise more slowly 
than productivity.
Macroeconomic 
Imbalance Procedure
Many economic indicators 
are monitored in this proce-
dure. Current-account bal-
ances in the EU may not be 
less than minus four percent 
of GDP or more than plus 
six percent of GDP on aver-
age over three years under 
the agreed procedure.
How are imbalances 
corrected in the EU?
Some Eurozone countries are 
suffering under such imbalances. 
In many euro-area countries, the 
unemployment rate is very high at 
ten percent or more, for example 
in France, Italy and Spain. These 
countries urgently need more 
external demand so as to stimulate 
their economy. In Germany, by con- 
trast, the unemployment rate is at 
four percent, its lowest level since 
reunification.
The euro influences the balance  
of trade through two channels. On  
the one hand, a fairly weak euro makes 
exports cheaper and imports more 
expensive relative to the rest of the 
world, thereby contributing to the 
development of surpluses. A strong 
euro has the reverse effect. On the 
other hand, it is impossible in the 
Eurozone to correct imbalances be-
tween member states by revaluing 
or devaluing the national currency. 
Many years of stagnant wages in Ger-
many therefore led to an  internal 
devaluation, giving the country a 
com petitive advantage that showed 
up in its trade surpluses.
A stronger euro would not automati- 
cally correct the imbalances in the 
EU. If the European Central Bank 
tapered its bond buying programme, 
the euro might appreciate as a result 
and strengthen imports relative to 
exports. However, this would simply 
alter the Eurozone’s trade deficit with 
the rest of the world overall, but not 
the imbalances among the euro-area 
countries. One also needs to take into 
account that Germany, for example, 
had a surplus for many years prior to 
the introduction of the euro. 
The EU can only take limited action 
to address imbalances right now. 
Since 2011, there has been the so-
called  Macroeconomic Imbalance 
Procedure: If deficits or surpluses  
are found to be too high, the Euro- 
pean Commission issues reform re- 
commendations, for example, with 
respect to the labour market or 
investments. However, only a small 
portion of these recommendations 
has been implemented so far.
In the EU, there are imbalances, 
above all in the  current account.  
At first, deficits were criticised, but 
now the issue is sur pluses: During 
the crisis in 2008, half of all member 
states had current -account deficits 
of up to 20 percent of gross domestic 
product (GDP). Other countries have 
been running high surpluses of more 
than eight percent of GDP for years, 
including Denmark, Germany and 
the Netherlands. Germany gener ated a 
surplus of 260 billion euro in 2016, for 
example, which was roughly twice as 
high as that of China, al though the 
Chinese economy is three times bigger. 
Countries with large surpluses are 
criticised from two directions and 
called upon to change practice:  
at both global and European levels. 
Germany, for example, is accused 
globally of exporting too much and 
importing too little. The Trump 
administration in the United States 
particularly finds fault with this. 
Other actors such as the International 
Monetary Fund and leading econo- 
mists complain that Germany saves 
too much and invests too little. 
Within the EU, a second topic of 
 debate concerns surpluses: Here it is  
argued that the German export boom 
contributes to unemployment in other 
Eurozone countries. Instead of stim-
ulating domestic demand, increas-
ing investments and importing more, 
Germany exploits external demand. 
Critics call on the federal government 
to take economic countermeasures.
But there are also opponents of such 
economic policy management. They 
argue that surpluses such as those 
in Germany are due to structural 
factors. The state cannot and should 
not correct such factors, they say. 
One of the main reasons for this, they 
argue, is the demographic structure:  
If you save money for retirement, 
then you consume less and increase 
the  savings rate. Furthermore, wa-
ges have been rising since the crisis 
so surpluses will be corrected by 
market forces, if at all necessary.
“If wages had risen as much as called for, there 
would have been fewer jobs in Germany. [...] How 
can households abroad borrow money in order 
to buy German products? If financial markets 
were regulated such that it were more difficult to 
increase debt levels, the surplus would be lower.” 
Clemens Fuest, President of the ifo Institute 
in the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 19 April 2017 
Imbalances: 
Should the EU 
intervene?
Economic imbalances keep recurring in the EU. Differences in trade balances dominate 
the debate. Germany has been generating very high surpluses for years and meets 
criticism for this reason. Are imbalances a threat to the EU, and what role does the 
euro play in this? Should politicians adjust differences in the balance of trade? And if 
so, is that up to national governments or the EU?
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